A Finnish investigation into electronic components supplied to Russia has linked two Finnish citizens to exports worth almost 30 million euros, including technology that can be used in missile guidance systems, according to Yle’s MOT investigative programme.
The investigation examined international customs data and traced shipments from businesses connected to the two men to Russian companies linked to the country’s defence industry. The findings point to a supply network that has continued to provide Russia with Western electronic components despite European Union sanctions imposed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
MOT reported that it had not previously uncovered a comparable export operation of this scale in Finland since the sanctions were introduced. The case also stands out internationally because of the value and volume of the shipments.
At the centre of the investigation is Denis Emelianov, a Finnish citizen who was born in the Soviet Union and became a Finnish citizen in 2018. He lives in Luumäki, in South Karelia.
On paper, Emelianov operates an online shop selling specialist knives, with premises in central Lappeenranta. However, MOT found that his business activities extended well beyond retail. For years, a company registered in Hong Kong and linked to Emelianov had exported electronic components to Russia. Those shipments increased significantly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
According to MOT, the Hong Kong company supplied Russia with more than 20 million euros’ worth of electronic components that can be used in Russian missiles. The investigation found that the products reached companies supplying Russia’s defence industry, raising questions about how the trade continued despite EU restrictions on technology exports.
The business also attracted the attention of US authorities monitoring the international trade in dual-use technology, which can serve both civilian and military purposes. In autumn 2023, US authorities placed Emelianov’s Hong Kong-registered company on a blacklist.
The investigation describes the shipments as part of a wider international procurement system. Russia has struggled to produce enough of certain electronic components domestically and has relied on networks operating across dozens of countries to obtain supplies from abroad. According to MOT, the two Finnish citizens investigated were involved in this broader network.
Emelianov’s Hong Kong-based company and a second company connected to another Finnish businessman and registered in Serbia traded with Russian buyers both separately and in cooperation with each other. Together, the two Finns were linked to exports of nearly 30 million euros’ worth of components to Russia, according to the investigation.
One of the network’s most important Russian customers is a company that sends electronic components to the Arzamas Instrument-Building Plant. The facility manufactures parts for Russian cruise missiles that help stabilise the weapons during flight and guide them towards their targets, according to MOT.
The findings have implications beyond sanctions enforcement. Ukrainian authorities have said that Russian attacks on civilian areas are intended, in part, to spread fear and weaken public resistance. The United Nations has reported that at least 17,000 civilians, including more than 800 children, have been killed in Ukraine. Electronic components used in military systems can form part of the supply chain behind such weapons, although the investigation’s findings do not establish that every component exported by the companies was used in a specific attack.
MOT decided to name Emelianov because of what it described as his significant role in the network. Contacted by telephone, he denied breaking sanctions or supplying components to companies serving Russia’s military.
He later submitted a more detailed response through a Finnish lawyer. Emelianov said the products his business supplied to Russia were intended exclusively for industrial use. He also said that, to his knowledge, he had not knowingly violated EU sanctions.
However, the investigation identified further business connections. MOT found that Emelianov is a director of a company registered in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, which has also exported technology to Russia. The finding suggests that the trade associated with him extends beyond the Hong Kong-registered business at the centre of the investigation.
The case illustrates the difficulty of restricting Russia’s access to technology through international trade networks. Although sanctions limit the export of certain goods to Russia, electronic components can pass through companies and intermediaries operating in multiple jurisdictions. Tracing the final destination and end use of those products remains an important part of efforts to prevent restricted technology from reaching Russia’s military industry.
